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An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law
and Family Law
Margaret A. Burnham*
[T]he father of a slave is unknown to our law ....
Frazier v. Spear, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 385, 386 (1811).
[T]he young of slaves ... stand on the same footing as other
animals ....
M'Vaughters v. E/der, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 7, 12
(1809).
[Slaves could not legally marry, for] . . . to fasten upon a
master of a female slave, a vicious, corrupting negro, sowing
discord, and dissatisfaction among all his slaves; or else a thief,
or a cut-throat, and to provide no relief against such a nui-
sance, would be to make the holding of slaves a curse to the
master.
Thomas Cobb, An Inquiry Into The Law Of Negro
Slavery In The United States of America 246 (1858).
I. Introduction
The perversions of the human soul wrought by American
slavery have been well told. Fictive and historical modes, songs
and sonnets, have carried over the centuries the bitter seeds of the
awful deeds. In lengthy tracts, scholars have retraced the crimes
of the trade and the plantation, while slaves themselves have
borne witness in searing personal narratives. We all know some-
thing of the horrific legacy of the peculiar institution: a warped na-
tional personality and a twisted color consciousness which has
invaded every facet of our lives.
Recent studies of slavery have begun to turn to the law which
undergirded the institution in an effort to understand this legacy
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more fully.' The questions posed by those of us who study slave
law are of two types: we seek to comprehend the manner in which
legal principles were molded and manipulated to serve the institu-
tion's interests, and we employ the law to help fill out the histo-
rian's understanding of slavery's social reality. In this sense, the
law becomes another tool of historical reconstruction.
From the beginning of the trade in 1619, slavery pressed the
legal system. The law had to accommodate slavery's First Princi-
ple-humankind as property-even while it sought to set in legal
stone bourgeois republican notions of equality and human rights.
What was required was a system of laws flexible enough to hold
the slave to the common code of conduct in certain circumstances
while exempting him in others, a system which respected the
slaveholders' right to rule their property without altogether yield-
ing the state's right to govern aspects of Black-white, slave-master
relations. To further complicate the picture, the ideological fine-
tuning which slavery demanded took place in the context of a legal
system in its infancy. The inherited common law jurisprudence of
England provided some guidance, but precedents unique to the
United States were yet to be firmly established. Thus, no for-
mulaic recipe could be turned to; legislators and judges had to find
their own way through a thicket of conflicting values and
interests.
These intractable contradictions of legal principle were
sharpened in the nineteenth century, for here was a historical mo-
ment of both deep political turmoil and legal consolidation.2 This
era of legal history is the territory of this article. The article ex-
plores the relationship between the development of family law in
the nineteenth century and the southern law of the slave family.
1. Historical studies which draw on legal sources include John Blassingame,
The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South (1979); Winthrop
Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (1968);
and Juliet E.K. Walker, Free Frank: A Black Pioneer on the Antebellum Frontier
(1983). General studies of the legal status of slaves include Daniel Flanigan, The
Criminal Law of Slavery and Freedom, 1800-1868 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Rice University); A. Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race & the
American Legal Process: The Colonial Period (1978); Judicial Cases Concerning
American Slavery and the Negro (Helen Tunnicliff Catterall ed. 1926); and Mark
Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: Considerations of Humanity &
Interest (1981). State studies include Florence Beatty-Brown, Legal Status of Ar-
kansas Negroes before Emancipation, 28 Ark. Hist. Q. 6 (1969); James Currie, From
Slavery to Freedom in Mississippi's Legal System, 65 J. Negro Hist. 112 (1980); and
William Imes, The Legal Status of Free Negroes and Slaves in Tennessee, 4 J. Negro
Hist. 254 (1919).
2. For a comprehensive history of the development of United States law in the




During the nineteenth century, the law sought to give new
definition to family life-prescribing the roles of husband and
wife, setting the parameters of marriage and divorce, and adjusting
ancient rules and taboos about sex and procreation outside of mar-
riage.3 The body of law that emerged recognized the family as an
organic, autonomous legal entity, and established the framework
for the public governance of private life still remaining to this day.
The slave family, however, was constructed outside of legal
developments governing family relationships. The notion of legal
autonomy within the private sphere had no meaning for the slave
family, whose members could lawfully be spread to the four cor-
ners of the slave south. Notwithstanding blood ties and romantic
love, the slave family could not be an organic unit of permanently
linked, interdependent persons. In the eyes of the law, each slave
stood as an individual unit of property, and never as a submerged
partner in a marriage or family. The most universal life events-
marriage, procreation, childrearing-were manipulated to meet
the demands of the commercial enterprise. Although slaves did
marry, procreate, and form families, in some cases even under the
compulsion of the master, they did so without the sanction of
southern law.
In the nineteenth century, the denial of legal protection to
slave family formation created an impossible tension in the law.
The tenets of family law held that marriage and family were natu-
ral, sacred, and morally compelled. The family-husband, wife,
and child-was an earthly representation of the holy trinity. Thus
the law was deemed to be based both on God's plan and command,
and on natural law which is but itself a reflection of divine law.
That slaves, who were admittedly human creatures of God, were
excluded from these sacred rules presented a profound challenge
for a purportedly rationally based, consistent legal system.
This article argues that the courts wrote slaves out of family
law by declaring them to be a different kind of human being-in-
nately and immutably immoral (therefore not legally marriagea-
ble), too dumb and childish to themselves parent (therefore
incapable of childrearing), and sexually licentious (therefore un-
suited to marriage and family bonds). The legal gyrations required
to accomplish this feat infected family law into the twentieth cen-
tury. Further, this legal endorsement of the idea that the slave
family was inherently "different" has been reflected in the reality
3. For a comprehensive treatment of the development of family law in the
nineteenth century, see Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth (1985).
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of Black family life for decades.4
In exploring these issues, this article briefly examines the ac-
tual family experience of the nineteenth century slave. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the case law which evolved to govern
slave family relationships. 5
As is often the case, the divisions in this article must be
somewhat artificial, for the two areas discussed are inextricably
and inevitably connected. On the one hand, the case law illus-
trates how social relations were experienced by giving us factual
detail and revealing standards of conduct. On the other hand, to
give an account of the social relations is to lay out the fabric upon
which the law stitched its ideological threads.
II. The Family Experience of the Slave
Recent studies of slavery6 have established that slaves dis-
played considerable independence in how they organized their
family lives. These studies point to kinship and family patterns
which were shared by slaves in disparate geographical regions as
evidence that the slaves built their own world.7 In particular,
naming practices have been noted to illuminate the significance
slaves attributed to kinship relations.8
The conduct of newly freed slaves in renewing their marriage
vows and seeking out family members separated during slavery, 9
also attests to an enduring commitment to family relations. Fur-
4. A sociological and historical comparison of Black and white family life is be-
yond the scope of this article. The rich literature on the subject includes Andrew
Billings]ea, Black Families in White America (1968); The Negro American Family
(W.E.B. DuBois ed. 1970); E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family in the United
States (1939); Jacqueline Jones, Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow; Black Women,
Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present (1985); Joyce Ladner, To-
morrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman (1971); Carol Stack, All Our Kin: Strate-
gies for Survival in a Black Community (1975); and The Family Life of Black
People (Charles Willie ed. 1970).
5. In the section on the legal governance of slave family relationships, this ar-
ticle is not comprehensive, but rather is a selective survey of illustrative cases.
Moreover, this discussion focuses primarily on case law, rather than on legislation.
It was ordinarily the southern courts which were called upon to explain why the
slave could be denied in civil law what he or she was accorded by natural law.
6. See, e.g., Blassingame, supra note 1; Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll:
The World the Slaves Made (1976); and Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in
Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (1976).
7. Historian Eugene Genovese believed this concept to be so fundamental that
he incorporated it into the title of his book. Genovese, supra note 6.
8. Gutman illustrates the efforts of slaves to communicate and institutionalize
kinship relations by, for example, naming children after parents, grandparents,
aunts and uncles. Gutman, supra note 6, at 93-95, 118-29.
9. Gutman draws a heart-rending picture of the ex-slave's heroic efforts to se-
cure family bonds. Id. at 363.
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thermore, strong familial ties are said to have inspired escapes
from slavery and other forms of resistance.1 0
This new evidence of slave resilience and initiative in the face
of degradation has resulted in an important reassessment of the
character of the slave family. It establishes that the family served
as shield and sword,ii a critical institution in the well-documented
culture of slave resistance.1 2 In the slave quarters, there existed a
distinct moral system which evolved from the slave's African cul-
tural inheritance as well as from the influence of Christianity and
the majority Western culture.13 While slaves surely feared the
master's power and adapted their behavior accordingly, their ethi-
cal beliefs, as reflected by their behavior in the quarters, were not
wholly shaped by their inferior legal status. Put another way,
while the law viewed the slave as immoral, slaves had their own
moral vision and standards, which did not yield before the judg-
ment of the master class or the courts.
The thrust of this fresh perspective, however, is not intended
to dwarf the awesome impact of the master's manipulative hand
on slave marriage and family life. True, out of physical and emo-
tional deprivation and torment the slaves made a space for them-
selves and their kin, but it was a space on the master's terrain.
A. The Slave as Member of the Plantation Family
In the mid-nineteenth century, with increasing pride in their
peculiar institution, southerners came to employ the description
10. Advertisements for runaway slaves poignantly attest to the family connec-
tion as a motivation. Id. at 264-65. This advertisement appeared in the Raleigh
Register on February 20, 1818:
"FIFTY DOLLARS REWARD. Ran Away from the subscriber, living
in Franklin County, North-Carolina on the 12th of January, 1817, a
Negro Man named Randol about 26 or 27 years of age.... His wife
belongs to a Mr. Henry Bridges, formerly of this county, who started
with her about the 14th instant, to South-Carolina, Georgia or Tennes-
see. It is supposed he will attempt to follow her."
Bobby Jones, A Cultural Middle Passage: Slave Marriage and Family in the Ante-
Bellum South 204 n.135 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Caro-
lina)(quoting Raleigh Reg., Feb. 20, 1818). Genovese refers to studies showing that
"thousands of slaves ran away to find children, parents, wives, or husbands ..
Genovese, supra note 6, at 451. But cf infra text accompanying note 56.
11. As to the role of women in cultivating resistance in the slave community,
see Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of
Slaves, 3 Black Scholar 3 (Dec. 1971).
12. For a recent assessment of the centrality of resistance to the American
slave experience, see In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afro-Ameri-
can History 133-42, 143-65 (Gary Okihiro ed. 1986).
13. For a discussion of the influences shaping the slave's moral values, see
Genovese, supra note 6, at 161-255.
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"domestic slavery."14 Initially, the term was coined to distinguish
"political slavery" (the relationship between the colonists and Eng-
land) and "civil slavery" (suffered by free Blacks denied civil
rights) from the perpetual nature of African slavery in the
South.15
The term signified more than merely the lowest level of
political and civil deprivation. By "domestic," slaveholders and
their apologists meant to imply two dimensions of slavery. First,
in their estimation, the slavery of their day had been tamed, or do-
mesticated. They boasted that conditions of life and work for the
slave were far milder than had been the case in earlier genera-
tions. Second, by "domestic," these observers meant that slavery
had placed master and slave within the same domestic sphere.
Each lived more or less in close proximity. The nature of the do-
mestic domain of the slave was determined by the master, and the
slave's fate was buffeted by both the economic and the domestic
fortunes of the master. It is this second point that is addressed
here.
Often referring to all of the inhabitants of the plantation as
"my people," the master considered it his reign and responsibility
to govern the social and work lives of his slaves as well as that of
his nuclear family. The image cultivated was that of the benefi-
cent patriarch,16 master of both his slaves and his own household.
One North Carolina slaveholder expressed in his will this view of
the extended plantation family: "'I lend the whole of my property
... to my beloved wife ... for the purpose of raising, clothing and
educating my children, and also raising the young negroes that are,
or may hereafter, be born in my family.' "17
There were three social configurations over which the slave-
holder exercised primary control.18 The entire plantation com-
14. Reference to the term is found in the case law. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13
N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829), "[the master-slave relation has been compared] to the
other domestic relations .. . [such as] the parent over the child ...." Id. at 265.
15. Willie Lee Rose, Slavery and Freedom 20-21 (1982) (citing a 1794 essay by
the Virginia jurist, St. George Tucker).
16. William Byrd, a Virginia planter, wrote in 1726, in a letter to the Earl of
Orrery:
"I have a large Family of my own," he wrote. "Like one of the Pa-
triarchs, I have my Flocks and my Herds, my Bonds-men [sic] and
Bond-women." He had to "take care to keep all my people to their
Duty, to set all the springs in motion, and to make everyone draw his
equal share to carry the Machine forward."
Quoted in id. at 21.
17. Spruill v. Spruill, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 175, 176 (1812).
18. "As master, the slaveholder presided over not one, but three interlocking
domesticities - his blood family, the slave families, and the larger family of the
plantation community." Rose, supra note 15, at 28.
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prised a social and economic unit. Within the "big house," both
master and mistress maintained their spheres of operation, and
each ruled the household slaves. Yet, it was the master who held
the ultimate right to control his wife,19 any property she brought
into the marriage,20 and the couple's children. In the quarters,
slave husbands exercised circumscribed authority over their wives
and children, but the right to control the shape and integrity of
the slave family rested with the master.
This "one big happy family" image celebrated by slavery's ad-
herents portrayed social and economic relationships on the planta-
tion, among slaves and freemen alike, as organically
interconnecting ones. This portrayal echoed the idealized nine-
teenth century view of the family as a refuge and safe haven,
where flourished man's purest and most selfless instincts. The
southern environment was much acclaimed as a natural setting for
the family, and it became a tableau upon which images depicting
pastoral simplicity and the wholesome virtues of rural life were
painted. According to the ideal, the arms of the extended planta-
tion family shielded the white mistress and her children as it did
the Black slave and her children.21
This "plantation as extended family" rubric also provided
19. One case, reflecting the onerous nature of mid-nineteenth century divorce
law as well as the precarious positions of both the slaveholder's wife and his slaves,
denied a divorce based on "indignities" to a woman. The woman charged, among
other matters, that her husband had shot a valuable slave belonging to her chil-
dren, and had whipped two other slaves near her sickroom window, thereby wors-
ening her illness because of the slaves' shrieks and moans. The court denied her
petition:
So far as appears from the petition, he may have had good cause for
inflicting punishment upon the slaves, and the only error he commit-
ted was in using an improper instrument [a gun] with which to punish
the first, and to have selected an improper time and place for chastis-
ing the others.
Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 202, 212 (1857).
20. The husband held the right to manage and control his wife's slaves, and to
the profits from their labor. The first Married Women's Property Acts enacted in
the southern states were in part designed to protect the wife's slave property from
the husband's creditors. See Linda Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts,
1839-1865: Reform, Reaction, or Revolution?, in 2 Women and the Law 72-73 (D.K.
Weisberg ed. 1982).
21. Thomas Cobb, a legal commentator of the period, placed the slave squarely
within the "familia":
As a social relation, negro slavery has its benefits and its evils.
That the slave is incorporated into and becomes a part of the family,
that a tie is thus formed between the master and slave,... that the old
and infirm are thus cared for, and the young protected and reared, are
indisputable facts. Interest joins with affection in promoting this unity
of feeling. To the negro, it insures food, fuel, and clothing, medical at-
tendance, and in most cases religious instruction.... [T]he institution
prevents the separation of families, to an extent unknown among the
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multiple layers of moral defenses for the slaveholder, defenses
which were much needed as the anti-slavery forces increased in
number and strength. The family was deemed to be the spiritual
and moral hub of the society; it was a morally superior place.
Slavery's advocates argued that the plantation-extended fam-
ily was the best suited institution to transmit moral imperatives to
an otherwise heathen population of African slaves. The family
constellation-man, woman, and children-and the superior posi-
tion of the husband in the family was believed to be commanded
by both nature22 and God.23 Similarly, the subjugation of slaves to
the will of the master, head of the plantation-extended family, was
deemed natural and divinely ordained.24 Sanctified and sacred re-
lations characterized the plantation-extended family, both within
the planter's blood family and between him and his slaves. As one
South Carolina court stated, "unless there be something very per-
verse in the disposition of the master or the slave, in every in-
laboring poor of the world. It provides him with a protector, whose in-
terest and feeling combine in demanding such protection.
To the master, it gives a servant whose interests are identical with
his own, who has indeed no other interest, except the gratification of a
few animal passions ....
In short, the Southern slavery is a patriarchal, social system. The
master is the head of his family. Next to wife and children, he cares
for his slaves. He avenges their injuries, protects their persons, pro-
vides for their wants, and guides their labors. In return, he is revered
and held as protector and master.
Thomas Cobb, An Inquiry Into The Law Of Negro Slavery In The United States of
America at ccxvii-ccxviii (1858).
In one case where equitable relief was sought to prevent the sale of related
slaves, the court intervened on the ground that "slaves constitute a part of the fam-
ily, entitled to, and receiving, if they be worthy, the affections of the master .
Loftin v. Espy, 12 Tenn. (4 Yer.) 84, 92 (1833).
22. The common law echoed Blackstone's description of nature as "guided by
unerring rules laid down by the great Creator." 1 William Blackstone, Commenta-
ries *39.
23. Justice Bradley's famous concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872) is illustrative. The issue presented was whether the plaintiff,
Myra Bradwell, could be denied admission to the Illinois bar on account of her sex.
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood.
Id. at 141.
24. Cf. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829), which maintained that "[tihe
slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his
master; that his power is in no instance, usurped; but is conferred by the laws of
man at least, if not by the law of God." Id. at 267.
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stance where a slave has been reared in a family there exists a
mutual attachment .... The tie of master and slave is one of the
most intimate relations of society."25
Slaves were the moral inferiors of white men. White women
were white men's moral superiors, but their physical and intellec-
tual inferiors-26 Therefore, both slaves and white women, whether
morally weak or physically fragile, required the protection of the
master, which was best provided in the context of the plantation-
extended family.27
Moreover, slavocracy's claim that the plantation provided the
slave with a family experience was the answer to those who
charged that the trade was the very antithesis of family.28 Slavoc-
racy's proponents argued that while the law granted no family
rights to slaves, the property relationship between slave and
master incorporated a family relationship. The civil laws of mar-
riage and child legitimation did not apply to the slave, but nature's
laws grouping men, women, and children in family formation were
nevertheless abided because the slave had a family-the owner's.
B. The Slave's Marital Experience
Typically, slaves chose their own marital partners,29 perhaps
25. Sarter v. Gordon, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 121, 135 (1835).
26. The racial and sexual divisions of slavery's moral hierarchy are brilliantly
described in a literary criticism of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin. See
Amy Schrager Lang, Prophetic Woman: Anne Hutchinson and The Problem of Dis-
sent in The Literature of New England 193-214 (1987).
27. Gunnar Myrdal, in his classic text, An American Dilemma: The Negro Prob-
lem and Modern Democracy, cites a particularly revealing passage from a 19th cen-
tury sociologist on the subject of wives and slaves:
"A beautiful example and illustration ... is found in the instance of
the Patriarch Abraham. His wives and his children, his men servants
and his maid servants, his camels and his cattle, were all equally his
property .... Who would not desire to have been a slave of that old
Patriarch, stern and despotic as he was?... Pride, affection, self-inter-
est, moved Abraham to protect, love and take care of his slaves. The
same motives operate on all masters, and secure comfort, competency
and protection to the slave. A man's wife and children are his slaves,
and do they not enjoy, in common with himself, his property?"
II Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern De-
mocracy 1073-74 (1944)(quoting George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South 297
(1854)).
28. The deleterious and immoral effect of slavery on the family was a key
plank in the abolitionists' political rhetoric. See, e.g., George Bourne, Slavery Illus-
trated In Its Effects Upon Woman and Domestic Society (reprinted 1972) (Boston
1837).
29. Speaking more strictly, it was the male slave who chose the female. If he
wished the union, and the master approved, little regard was paid to the desires of
the woman. "De massa say, 'Jim and Nancy, you go live together,' and when dat
order give, it better be done. Dey thinks nothin' on de plantation 'bout de feelin's
of de women and dere ain't no 'spect for dem." Slave Narratives, XVI, Part 3, 191.
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with their parents' approval.30 Slave-owners, however, also forced
unions.31 Even when the partners self-selected, they could not be
married until the master gave his consent.3 2 When, as frequently
happened, the partners lived on different plantations, each master
had to grant consent.33 In these cases, called "broad-marriages,"34
the family was united only on weekends and holidays when the
husband traveled to the wife's plantation.35
The marriage ceremony itself was performed by the master,
Slaveholders sometimes even asked their male slaves if there was someone at the
auction block they might like for a wife, with no concern for other ties or interests
the woman might have. Jones, supra note 10, at 83-84 (1965) (citing Slave Narra-
tives, II, Part 4, 39; II, Part 5, 181).
30. See Genovese, supra note 6, at 464, on parental supervision of courtship and
marriage.
31. In 1848, after a visit to his Alabama estate, a planter named John Hartwell
Cocke, made this entry in his private diary:
"A few days looking into the state of my plantation ... disclosed a
shocking state of moral depravity .... Two of my Foreman's Daugh-
ters had bastard white children. A state of almost indiscriminate sex-
ual intercourse among them-not a marriage since I was last there-3
years ago....
I now commanded, that which I had formerly requested and ad-
vised-'that they should be married forthwith or be punished and
sold'-they chose the first alternative. I allowed one week for them to
make matches among themselves-but what was not agreed upon, at
the expiration of that time-I should finish by my own authority-un-
til every single man and woman were disposed of and united in
marriage."
Quoted in Rose, supra note 15, at 18-19.
32. One scholar cites the prosecution of a Virginia slave who murdered her mis-
tress in 1827 because she had been denied the right to marry the man of her choice.
Flanigan, supra note 1, at 54. In another case, a free Black man who failed to
clearly establish that he had obtained his wife's master's consent, as required by
statute, was prosecuted for marrying a slave woman. State v. Roland, 28 N.C. (6
Ired.) 241 (1846).
33. This required consent made it difficult for some slaves to marry. As noted
one slave:
"I... had a hell of a time gittin' a wife durin' slavery. If you didn't see
one on de place to suit you and chances was you didn't suit them, why
what could you do? Couldn't spring up, grab a mule and ride to de
next plantation widout a written pass. S'pose you gits your marster's
consent to go? Look here, de gal's marster got to consent, de gal got to
consent. It was a hell of a way!"
Slave Narratives, XIV, Part 3, 167-68.
34. Many planters discouraged "broad-marriages" because the owner of the
husband lost his claim to his male slave's progeny. Where the plantation population
of men and women was disproportionate, however, the slave master had little
choice in the matter. Writing in a planters' journal, one Georgia owner complained,
"'it is a source of deep regret to me, that I am not able to furnish a husband for
every woman I have.'" Jones, supra note 10, at 82 (quoting "Foby," Management
of Servants, in XI The Southern Cultivator 227 (Aug. 1853)).
35. Flanigan also describes an 1827 prosecution of a couple charged with con-
spiring to poison the wife's master because he would not permit them to visit one
another. Flanigan, supra note 1, at 54.
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or officiated by a Black preacher, 36 or, sometimes, a white one. 37
The Christian ceremony 38 mimicked that afforded whites,39 except
with respect to the promise of permanence. 40 It was also a practice
for couples to set up housekeeping with the master's consent, but
without a ceremony.41
C. Procreative and Sexual Control of Slave Women
The slaveholder had two principal interests in promoting
slave unions, both of which were tied to the plantation economy.
First, he was in the business of producing crops and of reproduc-
ing capital in the form of slaves.42 Second, family ties were be-
36. "In 1856 the plaintiff... a slave, ... and Eliza Elder, a slave, were married;
the marriage rites were solemnized by Fred. Martin, a colored preacher; it was by
and with the consent of the owners of the slaves." McReynolds v. State, 45 Tenn. (5
Cold.) 18, 19 (1867).
37. In cases where an ordained minister performed the ceremony, the church
would generally refuse to permit a second marriage if the former spouse was alive,
even if the first marriage was disrupted by the parties' involuntary separation.
Jones, supra note 10, at 95-96 (citing William Alexander Hoke Collection, XIX,
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina).
38. The role of the southern church in slave marriage reflected the contradic-
tions of the day. Some congregations held that slaves who were involuntarily
parted did not commit a sin when they remarried. Some even chastised and ruled
out of order white members who separated their slaves. Jones, supra note 10, at
157-5S. Equally as often, however, the church took the harsh position that the slave
partners could not remarry even after the loss of a spouse through sale. For exam-
ple, the Broad River Baptist Association of North Carolina, in 1820, advised its
member churches as follows: "'How shall a church proceed with a member in slav-
ery whose companion was taken away out of the country and sold, and the member
left has married another?' Answer, 'Agreeably to the Scriptures, the church could
not hold such an one in fellowship.'" Blassingame, supra note 1, at 171.
39. Much has been made, however, of the "broomstick" ritual, wherein, as part
of the ceremony, the couple sealed their vows by jumping over a broomstick. The
origins and meaning of this custom are unclear. See Gutman, supra note 6, at 282-
83; We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century 35-36 (Dorothy
Sterling ed. 1984).
40. Slaves knew that their nuptial rituals were different from those sanctioned
by law. A Black man, testifying in a case where the issue concerned the legality of
a 60 year marriage, said that the parties had been married "'like other darkeys did
in those days;'" and that, although they were slaves when they married, they were
" 'regarded as man and wife all the time by their neighbors.'" Andrews v. Page, 50
Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 653, 657 (1871). Another ex-slave, called as a witness in a case rais-
ing a similar issue in Canada, testified: "'I brought my wife from Virginia; she was
a free woman, I was a slave; I married her again in New York, to make the former
marriage valid; I was bound by Heaven by the first marriage, but not by the law of
the land.'" Harris v. Cooper, 31 U.C.Q.B.R. 182, 184 (Can. 1871).
41. We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century, supra note
39, at 35.
42. "[T]he scantiness of net profit from slave labour has become proverbial, and
nothing is more common than an actual loss, or a benefit merely in the slow




lieved to promote slave stability and docility.43
The economic value of the master's slave holdings depended
in part on the proven reproductive capacities of his bondwomen.
As her "increase" was his property, 44 the female slave was priced
for both her labor-producing and reproducing ability.45 Fertile wo-
men brought a higher price on the market,46 but sterile women
were often sold.47 One master, in his will, proffered freedom as
the incentive for a high yield: "If Jeany brings ten live children...
she shall be at her . . . liberty . . .48
Since economic interest was found in both her productive and
43. "Such marriages are permitted and encouraged by owners, as well in consid-
eration of the happiness of the slaves and their children, as because, in many ways,
their interests, as masters, is thereby promoted." Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. (6
Jones) 235, 237 (1858).
44. "When a female slave is given [by devise] to one, and her future increase to
another, such disposition is valid, because it is permitted to a man to exercise con-
trol over the increase... of his property .. " Fulton v. Shaw, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 597,
599 (1827).
45. Sterility of a slave believed by the purchaser to be fertile could afford him
grounds upon which to rescind the sale. In one case, the buyer of a female slave
sought judicial relief because he discovered "that her legs were ulcerated . . . and
owing to a malformation of the pelvis [she was) incapable of bearing children with-
out endangering her life, in consequence of which she was of little or no value."
Hooper v. Chism, 13 Ark. 496, 497 (1853). In fact, there is a preoccupation in cases
seeking to rescind contracts for slaves on account of "unsoundness", with the gyne-
cological disorders of females. See, e.g., Hooper v. Chism, 13 Ark. 496 (1853); Wil-
liams v. Miller, 21 Ark. 469 (1860); Marr v. Hill, 10 Mo. 320 (1847); Cobb v.
Fogalman, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 440 (1841); Gerkins v. Williams, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 11
(1855); Crabtree v. Cheatham, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 138 (1826); Shenault v. Eaton, 12
Tenn. (4 Yer.) 98 (1833); Walton v. Cottingham, 30 Tex. 772 (1868).
46. See, e.g., White v. Martin, 1 Port. 215 (Ala. 1834): "[A] jury would place a
higher value on a female slave promising issue, than on one of a contrary descrip-
tion; if she has proved the issue, between the conversion and the trial, she has fur-
nished the best evidence of that quality." Id. at 221. In another case, the
slaveholding parties-a widow and her female children-sought to exchange a boy
slave for a young woman or a woman and child, but were unable to make an even
exchange, because of the greater cost of females of childbearing age. Wynne v.
Warren, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 118 (1870).
47. "Melinda was a runaway, in chains, when he bought her, and . . . he soon
sold her; she was barren." Adams v. Jones, 39 Ga. 479, 488 (1869).
48. Fairclaim v. Guthrie, 5 Va. (1 Call) 5, 7 (1797). A latter-day Jeany sued and
won her freedom in accordance with a promise made to her by her master: "B. Tal-
bert, when he purchased the woman Jenny, made her a promise that when she
should have a child for every one of his, (he then having five) he would set her
free." Talbert v. Jenny, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 159, 159 (1828). In an unusual case, free-
dom was promised to another woman only on the condition that she did not bear
children: "Kerlin doth covenant ... that if the said Grace shall serve him ten years
without having children, then at the end of the said ten years to offer her her free-
dom .... " State v. Mount, 1 Coxe 292 (N.J. 1795), noted in IV Judicial Cases Con-
cerning American Slavery and the Negro, supra note 1, at 325. In yet another case,
an owner devised the unborn "progeny of [his female slave] Beck, whom he knew
to be a young breeding woman .... " Ellison v. Woody, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 368, 371
(1819). The court found this was his "means of providing for his ... children." Id.
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reproductive labor, the slaveholder asserted rights of ownership
over his female slaves' sexuality. The slave woman was deemed
sexual property not just as an instrument of reproduction, but
along the full range of her sexuality. She was owned as both a
procreative and a sexual object. Thus, she was available to be
raped and sexually abused with impunity by the slaveholder, his
sons, the overseer,49 or any other white man.50 And here, racist
and sexist ideology combined to justify the wrong.
For its procreative potential, the bondwoman's union in mar-
riage was promoted,51 and sometimes demanded,52 by the master.
If she was separated from her husband, or widowed, the master
could require her to take another husband.53 On the slave block,
49. See, e.g., Alfred v. State, 37 Miss. 296 (1859), in which the court refused to
permit the defendant-slave's wife to testify as to the overseer's rape of her, which
led to the overseer's death at her husband's hand.
50. As noted one author:
The slave girl is reared in an atmosphere of licentiousness and
fear.... When she is fourteen or fifteen, her owner, or his sons, or the
overseer, or perhaps all of them, begin to bribe her with presents. If
these fail to accomplish their purpose, she is whipped or starved into
submission to their will .... [R]esistance is hopeless.
Harriet Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl 51 (Jean Fagan Yellin rev. ed.
1987)(L. Maria Child ed. 1861).
She was also fair game for Black men, but a code of slave morality which took
a harsh view of adultery did protect the married woman to some extent from sex-
ual abuse by male slaves.
But cf. Dozier v. Freeman, 47 Miss. 647 (1873). Sexual behavior was controlled
in other ways as well. Although high birth rates were encouraged, in Dozier a
slave was sold because, among other things, she was "bad after men." Independent
female sexuality was penalized. Id. at 649.
51. Some masters arranged their slaves' marriages:
"Marsa used to sometime pick our wive fo' us. If he didn't have on his
place enough women for the men, he would wait on de side of de road
till a big wagon loded with slaves come by .... Wasn't no use tryin to
pick one, cause Marsa wasn't gonna pay but so much for her. All he
wanted was a young healthy one who looked like she could have chil-
dren, whether she was purty or ugly as sin."
Jones, supra note 10, at 84 n.70 (quoting Workers of the Writers' Program of the
Work Projects Administration in the State of Virginia, The Negro in Virginia
(1940); and Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South 278 (1930)).
Others took a more laissez-faire approach: "Mr. Hayward does not interfere
with his slaves in any way further than is necessary for the good of his own inter-
est. They may have two or three wives apiece so long as they do not quarrel about
them, but if they quarrel, he interferes." Basil Hall, The Aristocratic Journey: Be-
ing the Outspoken Letters of Mrs. Basil Hall Written during a Fourteen Months'
Sojourn in America 1827-1828, at 223 (1931).
52. Girls were forced to marry at a young age, often before they knew anything
about sexual relations. We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, supra note 39, at 33.
53. "Old massa go buy a cullud man name Uncle Charley Fenner.... Massa
brung him to de quarters and say, 'Renne, here you husband,' and den he turn to
Uncle and say, 'Charley, dis you woman.' Den dey consider marry .... Uncle Char-
ley, he good step-pa to us." Slave Narratives, XVI, Part 1, 137-38.
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she was sometimes randomly coupled with a male slave so as to
"play on the sentiments of prospective buyers who would purchase
a pair rather than separate them."54 In some cases, she was explic-
itly worked as a breeder.558
The master also employed socio-sexual control in the
quarters in order to contain resistance and enhance his power. Due
to the female slave's status as the master's lifetime captive, family
ties placed her in a cruel double-bind: the slave's yearning for free-
dom was whetted by her love for her family, and in particular, for
her children, whom, above all, she wished to see delivered from
the tyranny she had known. But, it was that very love, the desper-
ate desire to be with her family, that also tied her down. Family
life at once emboldened and dampened the slave's quest for
freedom.56
This dynamic was appreciated by the slavemaster, who saw
the family as an important support for the slave system.57 Mar-
riage was considered to have a quieting effect on restive slaves.5 8
Men were "given" wives in order to keep them sexually satisfied.
The interior family life of the slave was also subject to gov-
ernance and interference by the master. He could foment dissent,
encourage reconciliation, or simply specify the allocation of domes-
54. Jones, supra note 10, at 85 (citing II Joseph Ingraham, The Southwest by a
Yankee 195, 197 (1835); I James Paulding, Letters from the South, Written During
an Excursion in the Summer of 1816, at 123 (1817)).
55. No study has definitively shown how widespread slave breeding was, but it
is clear fertile women brought higher prices and were rewarded for childbirth:
The majority of planters utilized the carrot rather than the stick to in-
crease their stock. A "good breeder" was given a pig, a calico dress, or
better rations. One planter ruled that "women with six children alive
are allowed Saturday to themselves"; another promised his house ser-
vant her freedom after she bore five children ....
Quoted in We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century, supra
note 39, at 32.
In addition, "[o]ccasionally, slaveholders deliberately assigned slave men to live
and work as studs." Genovese, supra note 6, at 462. One slave did report, "I been
marry once 'fore freedom, with home weddin'. Massa, he bring some more women
to see me. He wouldn't let me have jus' one woman. I have 'bout fifteen and I
don't know how many chillen." Slave Narratives, IV, Part 1, 299.
56. For a discussion of the manner in which family ties limited the female
slave's desire and opportunity to escape, see Deborah White, Ar'n't I a Woman?: Fe-
male Slaves in the Plantation South 70-75 (1985).
57. In the 1750s, a Dutch slaveholder wrote from Louisiana that: "'It is neces-
sary that the Negroes have wives, and you ought to know that nothing attaches
them so much to a plantation as children.'" Quoted in Genovese, supra note 6, at
452.
58. "Slaves constituting a family would probably labor more cheerfully and har-
moniously together, and, by consequence, would be more useful than those not so
related." Bertrand v. Arcueil, 4 La. Ann. 430, 431 (1849).
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tic responsibilities.59 In regard to the master or his designees,
slaves had no right to personal privacy in their quarters; and had
only a derivative privacy right vis a vis other persons. The devel-
oping law of personal privacy held that "[tihe house of the slave is
the house of his owner; and the fact that it is used by the former
as his dwelling does not change its character .... "60
Even if the master paid no attention to home life in the
quarters, slaves fully realized that he could intervene at any time.
The master played a role in the termination, 61 as well as the initia-
tion of marriage. As he saw fit, he would permit or deny mis-
matched couples to divorce and remarry. He, himself, sometimes
brought about a separation which he determined to be in the best
interest of the couple.62 It was argued by one contemporary legal
scholar that the slave owner had to have the power to separate
couples, for
to fasten upon a master of a female slave, a vicious, corrupting
negro, sowing discord, and dissatisfaction among all his slaves;
or else a thief, or a cut-throat, and to provide no relief against
such a nuisance, would be to make the holding of slaves a
curse to the master.63
Slave couples sometimes violently resisted the actions of a
master who sought to keep them apart. A Tennessee court upheld
a death sentence imposed upon a slave for a "cruel murder, in-
flicted on a feeble old man, who had always been kind to [him],
and for no other reason than that [the old man] would not consent
that [he] should gratify the unlawful desire, to abandon [his] wife
and take another." 64
The master's primary weapon of discipline and social control
59. Some owners were quite specific in establishing rules for the slave family.
For example, a Mississippi plantation owner prescribed the following:
Each family to live in their own house. The husbands to provide fire
wood and see that they are all provided for and wait on his wife. The
wife to cook and wash for the husband and her children and attend to
the mending of clothes. Failure on either part when proven shall and
must be corrected by words first but if not reformed to be corrected by
the whip.
Bell Hooks, Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism 44-45 (1981).
60. Thompson v. State, 25 Ala. 41, 46 (1854).
61. Divorce was often the inevitable result of compelled marriages, or those en-
tered without the full consent of both parties. On slave marital separation and di-
vorce, see generally Genovese, supra note 6, at 465; White, supra note 56, at 156-58.
62. In one such case, the master sold off a wife who had, in a fit of jealousy,
attacked her husband with an axe. Even though she was thus physically removed
by this sale, the woman continued to claim the man was her husband and
threatened to bring harm to anyone who took up with him. He did not remarry. II
Harriet Martineau, Society in America 333-34 (1966).
63. Cobb, supra note 21, at 246.
64. Gilbert v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 524, 531 (1847).
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was, of course, the threat of separation, which hung like a dark
cloud over every slave couple and family.65 That a commitment to
marriage and family life endured despite this emotional devasta-
tion is one of the small miracles of Afro-American culture.
Although it was surely one of the worst features of slavery, the
courts often turned a blind eye to the cruelty of family separation.
In one such case, the sale of an entire family consisting of parents
and ten children in "one lot" was challenged by the heirs of an Al-
abama estate, since family groups sold for less than individuals.
The court noted that "although it would doubtless be proper to sell
husband and wife, or parent and small children together, it could
not be tolerated that twelve slaves, most of whom were grown,
should be sold in one lot. ... ."66
The nature of the economic relationships was such that the
slave marital bond was exposed even when the master himself es-
chewed family separation. As property, the slave could be seized
at any moment and sold to pay off a living owner's debts, or be
transferred following the owner's death during the settlement of
his estate.67 A kindly master was no assurance of family
65. The number of slave marriages which were ended by force or sale has been
approximated to be one in every six or seven. Gutman, supra note 6, at 318.
Through the use of quantitative measurements, Robert Fogel and Stanley
Engerman concluded that nine percent of marriages were destroyed through sales.
Robert Fogel & Stanley Engerman, 2 Time on the Cross: The Economics of Ameri-
can Negro Slavery 116 (1974). Another scholar, a critic of Fogel and Engerman,
more closely touched the heart of the matter in his analysis of the risk of sale. He
and Gutman estimated that, on the average, a slave would experience the sale of
11.4 members of his family of origin and his own immediate family. Herbert Gut-
man & Richard Sutch, The Slave Family: Protected Agent of Capitalist Masters or
Victim of the Slave Trade?, in Reckoning with Slavery: A Critical Study in the
Quantitative History of American Negro Slavery 94, 111 (1976). As a calamity which
could at any time disrupt the family, the threat of sale was in some ways as potent
a weapon of social control as the actual event.
66. McLane v. Spence, 6 Ala. 894, 897 (1844). But see Lawrence v. Speed, 5 Ky.
(1 Bibb) 401 (1811) where it was held that:
[I]t is the duty of the sheriff [generally] to sell separately property
which is divisible in its nature .... But [in] the present case . . . [t]he
mother and child were indeed physically divisible, but morally they
were not so; and the sheriff in selling them together certainly acted in
conformity to the dictates of humanity ....
Id. at 404.
67. One North Carolina slaveholder charged with disposing of an estate consist-
ing of a large slave family wrote another as to his intentions:
"I shall advertise to sell them separately, and then all together;
with right reserved in myself to choose which set of bidders shall be
the purchaser. I shall so advertise because in the first place the law
will require that they be sold separately, and in the next place because




D. The Slave Parenting Experience
The threat of sale and separation that so pained romantic ties
was an equally awful tool of terror for the slave mother and fa-
ther.69 The slave father was considered all but irrelevant. He was
expected to procreate, but he had neither a moral nor a legal right
to parent. As succinctly expressed by a Kentucky court, "the fa-
ther of a slave is unknown to our law . "70 While the slave
mother performed a critical reproductive function, as a parent, she
too, was unknown to the law. The law treated the birth of a slave
child not as a social, but as a commercial event.
71
Typically, slave children lived their early years with one or
both of their parents in the quarters.72 About four weeks after
birth, the mother was sent back to work in the fields or the big
house. The mother was allowed to nurse her baby, who might be
under the care of an elderly plantation nurse. As soon as the child
children; hoping that some person... will give one dollar more for the
whole than the aggregate amount of the separate sales.
The negroes are as follows-:
1 Hannah the mother aged about 36 to 40
2 Wilson a boy aged about 10 to 11
3 John a boy aged about 8 to 9
4 A girl aged 5 to 6
5 A girl aged 3 to 4
6 A girl aged 1 to 2
These negroes are healthy. Here are 5 of 11 children the woman
has had; the other 6 having been sold; not one of whom .. .is dead.
They are also on the side of father and mother of excellent temper
and character. The woman has had but one husband; he but the one
wife; they have always lived peaceably together, and were never sepa-
rated until Decm. 1840."
Jones, supra note 10, at 191-92 (quoting letter from Thomas Turner to Ebenezer
Pettigrew (Nov. 20, 1841), reprinted in Pettigrew Family Papers, Southern Histori-
cal Collection, University of North Carolina).
68. The will of one owner specifically provided for the break-up of his slave
families in order to meet his debts. In Turner v. Timberlake, 53 Mo. 371 (1873), the
owner wrote as follows: "[i]t is my will that ... all my just debts be fully paid, and
for that purpose I desire my wife to sell . . .forty-five acres . . . together with my
black woman Hannah and her children, except her son Alexander and daughter
Adeline .... Id. at 375.
69. Louisiana passed legislation prohibiting the separation of mothers and their
infant children. Louisiana law provided that no child under the age of 10 could be
sold away from its mother nor the mother from her child. See Kellar v. Fink, 3 La.
Ann. 17 (1848); and Childers v. Johnson, 6 La. Ann. 633 (1850), both referring to
Territorial Legislation of 1806 and cited in Judicial Cases Concerning American
Slavery and the Negro, supra note 1, at 587, 604.
70. Frazier v. Spear, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 385, 386 (1811).
71. See Cooper v. Purvis, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 141 (1853).
72. On the subject of the lives of slave children, see Blassingame, supra note 1,
at 183-85; Genovese, supra note 6, at 502-19.
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was able, usually around five or six, the child would be put to
work. On the larger plantations the initial tasks were with the
"trash gang," composed of youngsters who tended the grounds,
fetched water, and the like. As a young girl matured, she would
be assigned tasks requiring ever greater strength and skill until
she could take her place as a full hand in the fields or a servant in
the main house. Anytime after age ten, the child was subject to
being permanently separated from her family.73 Eventually, some-
times as early as the mid-teen years, she would leave her parents'
house, either to set up with a husband and children of her own, or
to be hired out or sold. Motherhood sometimes came very early, as
evidenced by one case concerning a dispute over the price paid for
"a woman, aged 17 years, and her three female children-one of
the age of six years; another, four; and the youngest, about one."74
After bringing her baby into the world, a slave mother had
little control over her child's existence. Mother and father could
and did exercise some discipline and provide guidance and all-im-
portant survival skills, but the child soon learned it was the master
who really held the whip and the reins. He, or his overseer, pre-
scribed the daily regimen. It was he, not the parent, who had the
right to tell the child when to rise, how long to work, what to eat
and wear, when and how to recreate, and when to go to bed. It
was he who could as readily discipline the parent or the child.
And, it was he who determined whether the child and parents
would have any relationship beyond the biological one at all.7 5
In the eyes of the master and of the law, good childrearing
was not essential; good slave-rearing was. As one traveler noted,
slave children had "[n]o education-no God-their whole life-
food and play, to strengthen their muscles and fit them for the
work of a slave."76 Although the system discouraged parents from
forming strong bonds, the slave mother was nevertheless con-
stantly accused of neglecting her children, and the father of bru-
tality.77 Indeed, slaves were cursed as both immoral and
incompetent parents.
73. Genovese reports that "[niot until the age of ten - usually twelve - did hu-
mane masters consider selling a child away from the mother, although a great
many less humane masters sold children at any age." Genovese, supra note 6, at
502.
74. Ingram v. Smith, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 97, 97 (1849).
75. As to the significance the slaves themselves attached to motherhood, see
White, supra note 56, at 108-10.
76. I William Russell, My Diary North and South 398 (1863).
77. One Virginia planter declared that he ran a nursery only because slave par-
ents were incompetent. Jones, supra note 10, at 107 (quoting A Planter, Notions on
the Management of Negroes, &c., IV The Farmers' Register 495 (Dec. 1836)).
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But, even though the institution squelched parental love, the
literature is replete with material demonstrating deep parental de-
votion. One Louisiana case, in which the plaintiff sought return of
the price paid for a slave, sets forth the story of a mother gone
mad with grief at having been separated from her children:
[After the sale and separation] she refused, from religious
scruples, to eat or take medicines on Fridays .. . saying that
God had appeared to her and forbidden it. This, and the fact
of her having on one occasion burnt her clothes .... induced
the belief . . . that the girl labored under an aberation [sic] of
mind, which they ascribed to religious enthusiasm and grief at
being separated from her children.78
Parents in name only, the slave mother and father could not
shape their child's existence, nor could they exercise control over
their child's fate-either immediate or long-term. Such control is
the essential feature of the parenting relationship, marking the
parent as different from other adults with whom the child might
interact. But the slave child was the equal of the parent at birth.
What slave parents did transmit was critical to the child's forma-
tive years, but the nature of the parenting relationship wholly de-
pended upon the grace of another, in whose hands the child's
future actually lay.
E. The Slave Family Experience: Conclusion
Plantation justice79 placed the master in the position of
priest, patroller, and arbiter of family relations in the quarters. He
was the ex officio family law judge, however, he exercised even
greater power than the courts, for unlike the civil judge, the slave-
holder could grant or deny family rights at will. He matched, he
married, and he divided, if he wished, at whim.
The law left the slaveholder to set the terms of all aspects of
the slaves' social existence-how they were punished, clothed,8 0
fed, cared for when sick,8 1 and the like. But the cornerstone of the
78. Buhler v. McHatton, 9 La. Ann. 192, 193 (1854).
79. For a general treatment of the exercise of quasi-legal authority by the slave-
holder, see Michael Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority
in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (1980).
80. In a ruling chastising a slaveholder who allowed his slaves to go around so
"destitute of clothing, that their organs of generation . . . were publicly exposed,"
Britain v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 203, 203 (1842), one court revealed its presump-
tion that slave sexual morality was the master's domain. "[I]f the defendant caused
and permitted his slaves to go about the country in ... a state of nakedness... he is
guilty of lewdness, and ought to be punished .... Id. at 204.
81. In reference to a requested jury instruction, an Alabama court in State v.
Abram, 10 Ala. 928, 929 (1847) wrote that:
The charge moved for, that if the prisoner was so sick as to be unable
to work, he was not bound to obey the command, of the overseer to go
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master's power was his reign over the slave family. This power
was most effectively magnified by his right, sanctioned by law, to
control conjugal and parenting rights, and to trample heedlessly
over the vows of marital exclusivity and permanence and the par-
ent-child bond. It was a power which rendered the source of the
slave's greatest solace-his family-also his Achilles' heel.
The slave family created a tension for the master as well as
the captive, since bonds of family loyalty simultaneously
threatened and enhanced the master's power. The master wished
for his slaves the passive contentment, but not the militant solidar-
ity which family life could bring. In walking this thin line, the law
was the slavemaster's guide, according him the power to coerce
and control at the point of the slave's greatest vulnerability.
III. The Contradictions in Slave Law and Family Law
The southern courts had the difficult task of reconciling the
contradictions between the slave family experience and the devel-
oping legal ideology as to the place of marriage and parenthood in
human society.
The southern bench was only one of many contributing voices
in a dialogue about the multifaceted moral contradictions slavery
presented. It was a voice constrained by a legal tradition that
sought to treat law and morality as reflections of each other. This
was especially the case with respect to marriage and family, and
therefore, the courts had to explain the seeming contradiction be-
tween slave law and family law.
Today, the law of the slave south is an essential source of the
history of the ideas of that period about marriage, family and slav-
ery. Nineteenth century case law and legislation serve as a mirror
of prevailing opinion and practice of the time. Yet, the law often
does not cast a literal reflection of experience. As one scholar of
slave law put it: "[w]hile statutes usually speak falsely as to actual
behavior, they afford probably the best single means of ascertain-
ing what a society thinks behavior ought to be; they sweep up the
felt necessities of the day and indirectly expound the social norms
of the legislators."82
At best, the law of the period served as an aspirational instru-
ment of the dominant class rather than an account of reality. The
to work, is entirely untenable. As a necessary consequence of the con-
dition of slavery, as it exists with us, the master, or the overseer repre-
senting him, and clothed with his authority, must be the judge of the
capacity of the slave to labor.
Id. at 932-33.
82. Jordan, supra note 1, at 588.
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case law can only provide evidence of how ruling class men viewed
Black slaves. Slaves themselves had no access to the courts,8 3 and
therefore the law's rendering of slave family sentiment is neces-
sarily incomplete. Further, it cannot lead us to reliable conclu-
sions about the relative social status of women and men within the
slave family itself.
Moreover, the common law method was not designed to faith-
fully document experience. In keeping with the praxis of the com-
mon law, slave law incrementally developed broad rules and
categories, and strived for uniformity and judicial consensus. In
this process, the multiplicity and complexity of the slave experi-
ence was washed over. The coarse legal conclusions necessarily
masked the great variety of social conditions experienced by
slaves. The plantation experience differed from the farm and
town experience, as the early nineteenth century experience dif-
fered from that of the pre-civil war, and as conditions in Missis-
sippi differed from those in Maryland. Finally, the cases
themselves do not tell us much about whether, or how, legal rules
actually affected the slave-master relationship.
These limitations set the contours within which to examine
how nineteenth century southern jurists reconciled the ideal of
marital sanctity and parental prerogatives with the law of slavery.
A. Conjugal Rights and Slave Law
There was one primary reason advanced to justify the denial
of the right of civil marriage to slaves.84 Marriage was described as
a civil contract, and, since slaves could not contract, they therefore
83. Slaves could not sue or be sued, except in suits for freedom, Cobb, supra
note 21, at 247. A slave could only give testimony in a case involving another slave.
Id. at 226.
84. There were no statutes forbidding slaves to marry in the slave-holding
states; rather, the prohibition was judicially defined. This result was by no means a
foregone conclusion, or a necessary consequence of slavery. Indeed, an early Massa-
chusetts statute provided that "no master should unreasonably deny marriage to his
negro with one of the same nation; any law, usage, or custom, to the contrary,
notwithstanding." Prov. Stat. of Oct. 1705, ch. 19, § 2, quoted in Smith v. Rosenthal,
cited in Validity of Slave Marriages: Opinion by Hon. James B. Bradwell 20 (1866).
One nineteenth century legal authority reported:
[E]ither in consequence of this provision, or of judicial adjudication
upon the question as one of common law, slave marriages were
deemed to be valid, and the rights of divorce were extended to slaves,
the same as to freemen. Thus. "in 1745, a negro slave obtained
from the governor and council". "a divorce for his wife's adultery
with a white man."
I Joel Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, of Separations
Without Divorce, and of the Evidence of Marriage in All Issues § 155 (1864)(quoting
Note to Oliver v. Sale, Quincy, 29).
1987]
Law and Inequality
could not marry. Further, the contract-like incidents of the mari-
tal relationship were deemed unenforceable with respect to slaves.
Fathers could not be held financially responsible for the support of
their wives and children because they had no legal right to be paid
for their labor.85 Slaves also could not be imprisoned for adultery
or bigamy since they were the mere property of their masters.8 6
As slaves were deemed morally inferior, it was considered to be
unduly and unnecessarily harsh to hold them to the legal stan-
dards of monogamous marriage. But, the real reason to deny legal
marriage to slaves was expediency: the sexual exclusivity and per-
manence implicit in marriage were inconsistent with the master's
right to sexually control and to alienate his slave property.
Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin of the North Carolina Supreme
Court, an exceptionally capable jurist who had provided leadership
to the entire South in the development of the law of slavery,8 7 ex-
plained why the law could deny slaves marital rights in the case of
State v. Samuel.88
It was a lover's triangle that gave rise to the prosecution. Sa-
muel, a slave, had killed his estranged wife's new lover. He ap-
pealed his murder conviction to the state high court, claiming as
error the trial judge's evidentiary ruling permitting the State to
call his wife as a witness against him. The defendant sought to es-
tablish that his wife's testimony was barred by the marital privi-
lege.8 9 The facts at trial showed he had been married to the
witness for ten successive years; the couple had five children; they
had separated; and, subsequent to the separation, the wife had
then, with her master's permission,90 taken the victim, now de-
85. Cobb, supra note 21, at 241.
86. See generally discussion on invalidity of slave marriages in Flanigan, supra
note 1, at 121-22.
87. Robert Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 77-79
(1975).
88. 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 177 (1836).
89. With the exception of Georgia, every other slave jurisdiction which consid-
ered the matter concurred with the result in State v. Samuel as to the applicability
of the privilege to the slave spouse witness. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 9 Ala. 990
(1846); Coleman v. State, 14 Mo. 157 (1851). The Georgia superior court, in a case in
which the prosecution had called the wife as a witness against her husband, ruled
that " '[t]he contubernal relation among slaves shall be recognized ... in criminal
trials where it becomes important to the advancement of justice'" William v. State,
33 Ga. 85, 93 (1864)(quoting § 1666, Code).
90. The facts of the case characteristically illustrate the intervention in slave
marital relations by the master. The owner of the defendant's wife, one A.M. Lea,
testified in support of the State's successful effort to defeat the privilege. He re-
lated that the spouses had quarreled, which resulted in the husband's departure
from the home. When Samuel, the defendant, did return to claim his clothes, Lea
ordered Samuel to stay away from his wife. Ultimately, it was Lea who gave the
victim permission to marry Samuel's wife.
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ceased, as her new husband.
The Chief Justice did not pause to ponder the evidentiary
wrinkle presented by the separation and purported remarriage.
He went right to the core of the case: "The question of evidence
made in this case, is not without difficulty; but, after the best re-
flection the court could bestow on it, that difficulty seems to arise
rather from moral considerations than to be founded on legal prin-
ciples." 91 After quickly identifying the moral dilemma, however,
Judge Ruffin perceived that the law offered no option: he had to
wiggle out of it. He first analyzed the reason for the common law
evidentiary rule of marital privilege:
No code could justly, by one of its edicts, pronounce that an
union between two persons once formed, should by no means
be severed, and yet, by another of its edicts, coerce them to
acts necessarily productive of dissensions, that would deprive
their union of all cordiality, separate them in feeling, and
make their connexion intolerable. 92
He then asserted that, as the privilege is grounded on the legal re-
quirement of marital permanence, it ought not be held to apply
where no contract exists to require such permanence:
This privilege . . .owe[s] its origin to the duration of the legal
obligation of the contract of marriage. It cannot be yielded to
any persons but such as have entered into that contract, in
that rightful and formal method which is recognized in law as
binding the parties throughout life, absolutely, and independ-
ent of the continuing inclinations of one or both of them, or
the continuing license of any third person. Hence a marriage
de facto will not, but only a marriage de jure, will exclude one
of the parties from giving evidence for or against the other.93
The "continuing license of any third person," namely the master's
license to separate one spouse from the other, in part prevented
the execution of a "contract" of permanent marriage. Here Judge
Ruffin faced an intractable collision between three inviolable, sa-
cred tenets he felt a legal duty to protect: marriage, the right to
contract, and the right to hold slaves as private property.
In Judge Ruffin's jurisprudential time, each of these "rights"
was deemed in some sense secured by natural law, the axiomatic
law of first principles. 94 The problem had yet another dimension,
91. Samuel, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) at 178.
92. Id. at 179.
93. Id.
94. Appeals to natural law were advanced on both sides of the slavery debate.
For example, one Chicago anti-slavery probate jurist, in an opinion written after
emancipation castigating the legal denial of slave marriage, argued:
Slaves are made by captivity, or by virtue of local law enacted against
the law of nature ... in fraud and wrong, and during this captivity or
slavery they are deprived of many of their civil rights, but upon their
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giving it even greater density. Marriage was sacred both because it
was the command of natural law,95 and because it was considered
to be a contract, which was sacrosanct in its own right.96
But, the very sine qua non of marriage-its intended perma-
nence-made marriage unlike a commercial contractual relation
which could easily be terminated at the will of both parties. More-
over, the terms of the marital relation were not the subject of bar-
gaining by the spouses, but were prescribed by the law.97 Marriage
was only a contract in the sense that the parties agreed to become
married to one another. In this sense, slave marriages were no dif-
ferent from any others. Slaves could agree, or contract, to "have
and to hold," and they could promise to do so until parted by
death,98 but that promise was unenforceable.
emancipation they are restored to their natural condition. Even in
slavery they are subject to all the laws of nature like other men [in-
cluding the natural law of marriage], for that force, or law, which de-
prived them of liberty, could not deny them the rights, nor absolve
them from the obligations of their nature.
Validity of Slave Marriages: Opinion by Hon. James B. Bradwell, supra note 84, at
19.
95. This command was judicially observed by creating a presumption in favor of
marriage: semper proesumitur pro matrimonio. In his treatise on marriage and di-
vorce, Bishop explained the reason for the presumption:
[B]ut for this institution [of marriage], all that is valuable, all that is
virtuous, all that is desirable in human existence, would long since
have faded away in the general retrograde of the race, and in the peril-
ous darkness in which its joys and its hopes would have been wrecked
together ....
* . * Therefore, every court, in considering questions not clearly
settled or defined in the law, should lean toward this institution of
marriage; holding, consequently, all persons to be married who, living
in the way of husband and wife, may accordingly be presumed to have
intended entering into the relation, unless the rule of law which is set
up to prevent this conclusion is distinct and absolute, or some impedi-
ment of nature intervenes.
Bishop, supra note 84, at §§ 12-13.
96. See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at
161-63 (1977).
97. One Kentucky court defined marriage as follows:
Marriage, though, in one sense, a contract, because, being both stipula-
tory and consentual [sic], it can not [sic] be valid without the spontane-
ous concurrence of two competent minds, is, nevertheless, sui generis;
and, unlike ordinary or commercial contracts, is publici juris, because
it establishes fundamental and most important domestic relations.
And, therefore, as every well-organized society is essentially interested
in the existence, and harmony, and decorum of all its social relations,
marriage, the most elementary and useful of them all, is regulated and
controlled by the sovereign power of the state, and can not [sic], like
mere contracts, be dissolved by the mutual consent only of the con-
tracting parties ....
Maguire v. Maguire, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 181, 183-84 (1838).
98. In fact, the traditional marriage vows were altered to reflect the possibility
of separation before death by sale or other cause attributable to the master. Geno-
vese cites the offering of one white minister-"until death or distance do you
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Properly viewed, the hard problem the court faced was not
that slaves could not cross the marital threshold in a "contractual"
sense; it rather was that, because they had no civil existence, they
could not assume the civil benefits and burdens of husband and
wife. 99
Judge Ruffin acknowledged the weakness of the "inability to
contract" argument. He noted that, because,
slaves are human beings, with passions and senses impelling
them to [marry], and with a natural capacity to contract it,
which no municipal regulation can annul .... It has been
urged that the essence of this, as of other contracts, consists in
the consent of the parties; which ... renders the contract obli-
gatory by the law of nature and of reason; and it was thence
inferred, that it is necessarily binding in our law, in the ab-
sence of positive provisions to the contrary.100
But, Judge Ruffin insisted on his vicious circle: only legal marriage
is legal, and an individual who cannot legally marry cannot agree
to be married:
[I]t has been constantly required as an essential requisite of a
legal marriage, that it should either be celebrated by some per-
son in a sacred office, or be entered into before some one [sic]
in a public station and judicial trust....
... How can that be deemed to any purpose a legal mar-
riage, which does not, in any respect, conform to the only legal
regulations upon the subject of marriage? 101
Finally, recognizing that slave ownership was simply incom-
patible with slave marriage, Judge Ruffin conceded that the courts
had no solution:
[It] may unfortunately be the law [that slaves cannot legally
marry]; and may have been intended by the legislature to be
the law, upon the general ground of the incapacity of a slave to
enter into this, as into other contracts, upon the presumption
of the want of free consent, and upon the further ground of
the difficulty of giving legal validity to the marriage, in respect
to its most important legal incidents, without essentially cur-
tailing the rights and powers of the masters. If it be so, it may
be a fit subject for legislative interposition, to avert this melan-
choly addition to the misfortunes and legal disabilities of this
depressed race.102
part"-and of a slave Gullah preacher-"Till death or buckra part you." Genovese,
supra note 6, at 481.
99. "[Slaves'] moral power to agree to such a contract or connection as that of
marriage, cannot be doubted; but, whilst in a state of slavery it cannot produce any
civil effect, because slaves are deprived of all civil rights." Girod v. Lewis, 6 Mart.
559, 559 (La. 1819).
100. State v. Samuel, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 177, 180 (1836).
101. Id. at 181-82.
102. Id. at 182.
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Having thrown the ball to the legislature, Judge Ruffin did
not then make a graceful exit from what one of his contemporaries
termed a "question of exceeding nicety and difficulty."103 Rather,
casting yet another eye on the "difficulty . . . aris[ing] . . . from
moral considerations,"'10 4 he laid blame at the feet of the slaves
themselves, for whom, he suggested, marriage would impose too
great a moral burden. His argument was that, were the Court to
recognize slave marriage for the purpose of the evidentiary rule in
question, it would, in logic, effectively be grafting all of the inci-
dents of civil marriage onto the slave relationship, including expo-
sure to prosecution for bigamy:
[T]he court is not prepared, without a mandate from a higher
authority than our own, to apply to this class of our population
a rule, which would in innumerable instances, either subject
them to legal criminality of a high grade, or deprive them al-
most entirely of their greatest solace-that of having families
of their own, frail as may be the right, and temporary the en-
joyment, dependent, as they are, upon the caprice of the par-
ties themselves, and yet more upon the necessities or caprice
of their owners.105
Thus, "after the best reflection the court could bestow on
it,"106 the argument reduced to two simple, related, syllogisms:
slave marriages are not legally valid because slaves cannot be le-
gally married, and the moral commands of marriage are not held
to apply to slaves because slaves are immoral.107 This then, was
the answer to Judge Ruffin's conundrum: the law of marriage re-
quired adherence to the moral norm, but slave morality was, by
103. [A]s the fact of cohabiting, and living together as man and wife, is
universal among slaves . . . these relations are recognized by the
Courts, and the merciful extenuations of the law, to the conduct of the
husband and father, are extended to the slave standing in the same sit-
uation ....
How far this contubernial [sic] relation between slaves may be rec-
ognized and protected by law, is a question of exceeding nicety and
difficulty.
Cobb, supra note 21, at 245.
104. Samuel, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) at 178.
105. Id. at 183.
106. Id. at 178. Indeed, Judge Ruffin's analysis was more incisive than that of
other jurists of the time. Most other courts considering the issue made no attempt
to reconcile law and morality, for, as Mark Tushnet has persuasively suggested,
most judges lacked Judge Ruffin's intellectual acumen or his grasp of the ideologi-
cal implications of the cases which came before him. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at
7-8. The Alabama Supreme Court was more typical in its ruling that "whilst we
admit the moral obligation, which natural law imposes, in the relation of husband
and wife, among slaves, all its legal consequences must flow from the municipal
law. This does not recognize, for any purpose whatever, the marriage of slaves
.... .Smith v. State, 9 Ala. 990, 996 (1846).
107. As to whether the law had any duty to enforce public morality in the slave
quarters, see Murray v. State, 9 Fla. 246 (1860), reversing a conviction for gaming:
[Vol. 5:187
AN IMPOSSIBLE MARRIAGE
nature, different from the norm. Therefore, the law did not vio-
late the moral norm in excluding slaves from the rules governing
marriage.
Employing the rationale that there was an innate difference
in the races, an entirely different set of moral standards could
therefore be applied to Blacks without offending natural law. This
double moral standard provided the underpinning for the criminal
law governing sexual interactions as well as the law of marriage.
In one particular aspect of the marital relation, however, at
least one court acceded to the Black slave husband the same right
as to the white husband.108 The common law provided a defense
to a murder provoked by the deceased victim's adultery with the
defendant's wife.109 The slave defendant in State v. John, con-
victed of murder, claimed on appeal that the trial court had erred
in excluding the mitigating evidence of his wife's adulterous rela-
tionship with the victim. While the appellate court rejected the ar-
gument because there was no showing that the homicide was
committed in the heat of passion, the court implicitly accorded to
the slave husband the same legal right to vindicate his wounded
male pride that was enjoyed by white husbands.110 In effect, the
court was declaring the slave wife to be, in this respect, as much
the exclusive sexual property of her husband-at least vis a vis a
slave competitor-as a white wife.
This holding excusing the male slave's use of violence to as-
sert proprietary rights over his wife speaks to an internal dynamic
of the slave marriage. The underlying rationale of the case is
based on the "natural" personality-in contradistinction to the
[lit is a difficult task to determine under statute offences against
morals whether [slaves] can commit the offences or not.
The only rule to govern us is the peculiar relation they bear in so-
ciety and towards their superiors.
Thus our general code provides and creates the offence of adultery
and fornication ... [y]et no one would think of indicting a slave for
such an offence ....
Id. at 253. But even though the slave could not be charged as an adulterer, a white
married man having sex with a slave could be divorced on the grounds of adultery.
Mosser v. Mosser, 29 Ala. 313, 316-17 (1856).
108. State v. John, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 330 (1848).
109. In order to mitigate the charge, the discovery of the adultery in process was
necessarily the proximate cause of the homicide:
"A husband finding a man in the act of adultery with his wife, and in
the first transport of passion killeth him; this is no more than man-
slaughter. But had he killed the adulterer deliberately and upon re-
venge, after the fact and sufficient cooling time, it had been
undoubtedly murder."
Id. at 336 (quoting Foster in his Crown Law 296).
110. John, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) at 336. See, to the same effect, Keith v. State, 45
Tenn. (5 Cold.) 35 (1867).
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civil personality--of the slave husband. Although he can make no
claims as a husband in a contractual or civil sense, his nature, as a
man and a husband, excuses the slave's violent action taken upon
"the sudden fury excited by finding a man in the very act of shame
with his wife . ",111 In this sense, he enjoys a form of male privi-
lege, and, albeit for a limited purpose, holds the legal status of
"husband."
The case of State v. John is also revealing in that, like other
cases of domestic violence, it provides a window into the private
life of a marriage. It particularizes the composite portrait we have
of the slave wife. The defendant's wife, Flora, tells a poignant
story about her break-up with John. As a chronicle of experience,
the case sounds a theme of male domestic dominance which is
hauntingly familiar to the contemporary ear. According to the
court opinion, Flora's testimony was that:
[S]he was the wife of the prisoner, and had been so for about
six years; that the prisoner, although a slave, was permitted to
keep house, and she was permitted to live with him; that she
and the prisoner had frequent quarrels, and sometimes sepa-
rated and came together again; that, some three or four days
before the homicide, the prisoner, complaining that his dinner
was not properly prepared, got angry, and gave her a whip-
ping, and turned her out of his house, saying that she should
not live with him any longer; that she then went to live with
her mother .... 112
She then told the story of the homicide itself:
[T]hat about 10 o'clock of the night of the homicide . . .the
prisoner came to her mother's house and told her ... that he
intended to kill [her new boyfriend] .. .that at the request of
her mother, she, and her sister . . .went to the house of the
[boyfriend] ... that shortly afterwards the prisoner came to
the door and. .. that he thereupon did break [the door] down,
and came in and [killed the deceased]; that she became much
alarmed and ran to call her brother from her mother's house,
and that her brother came immediately and got the prisoner
out of the house of the deceased. 113
As social history, the case informs on two levels. Flora's de-
pendence on her brother and mother suggests that slave family
ties were the first line of defense in times of crisis. The violently
possessive behavior of John, as shown by his treatment of both his
wife and the "other man," suggests that, notwithstanding the
emasculating effects of slave law, the prevailing culture of male
domestic dominance held sway in the quarters as well.
111. John, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) at 336.
112. Id. at 331.
113. Id. at 331-32.
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B. Procreative and Parenting Rights and Slave Law
Like the denial of marital rights, the denial of parental rights
to slaves flew in the face of ideological trends and their legal ech-
oes. This was the era of the cult of motherhood and domesticity.
Indeed, the identification of womanhood with motherhood was
near complete. Mother was now on her infamous pedestal, and
ironically, her singular and unique importance as mother served as
a threshold to greater legal rights for women. The judicially cre-
ated "tender years" doctrine114 enlarged women's guardianship
and custodial rights while diminishing the legal hold of patriarchy.
At the same time, the state, employing the doctrine of parens
patriae, was grasping a greater role for itself in childrearing.115
The young child was increasingly being viewed as an individual
and an incipient citizen, whose proper upbringing had become the
state's interest. State intervention to protect the parenting rela-
tionship, or to sever it in cases of abuse or neglect, was regarded as
appropriate to advance the "best interests of the child."116
In light of these developments, how could the law close its
eyes to the erasure of the slave parent? How could it sanction the
divorce of the birthing function from the mothering function,
child-bearing from child-rearing? And how could it withhold its
parens patriae oversight in the case of the slave child, who was
subject to the greatest abuses and the harshest conditions?
In contradistinction to the common law, the slaveholding
states all adopted the civil rule, partus sequitur ventrem-the is-
sue and descendants of slaves follow the status of the mother.117
The justification for the rule was the same as that offered by its
Roman originators: "'From the principles of justice, the offspring,
the increase of the womb, belongs to the master of the womb.' "118
In providing that the fruits of the bondwoman's womb were
the "property" of her master, slave law echoed early non-slave do-
mestic law.119 The master was deemed to "own" his wife and her
114. The "tender years" rule, which developed midcentury, is a presumption
favoring the mother in custody disputes involving an infant or child below the age
of puberty. For a discussion of the rule and its place in the expansion of maternal
rights, see Grossberg, supra note 3, at 248-49.
115. See id. at 236-37.
116. See id. at 234-42.
117. Cobb, supra note 21, at 68. For a discussion of the role of the principle of
partus sequitur ventrem in the early development of slave law, see Wilbert Moore,
Slave Law and the Social Structure, J. Negro Hist. 171, 185-87 (1941).
118. Cobb, supra note 21, at 69 (quoting Heineccius, Elem. Jur. Lib. I, tit. iii, § 81;
Potgiesser, De Statu Servorum, Proleg. § xxix; Domat, § 99).
119. For a general treatment of the relative marital property rights of husband
and wife in the colonial period, see Marylynn Salmon, The Legal Status of Women
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children, just as he "owned" the slave woman and her children.
Thus, the genesis of the rule involved two entangled proprietary
relations: the master's marriage (a property relation) produced
property for him (children), and his slave property also produced
more property (slave children).120
The slave husband, however, had no marital ownership inter-
est in his wife, and therefore he had no ownership interest in his
children. This effected a double diminution of the slave father's
legal and social status: he could not claim ownership of his chil-
dren, as could free men, nor could he, through his progeny, enrich
his master, as could slave women. He had only his own labor to
"give" his master, not that of his wife or his children.
In the mid-nineteenth century, changing views of white wo-
men and children had begun to challenge the principle of male
ownership of the "increase of the womb."121 No longer were wo-
men seen as vessels whose exclusive vocation was to produce heirs.
Property concepts were increasingly viewed as inappropriate in
the law of family relations. But since property was the sine qua
non of the slave-master relation, the rule persisted, reducing slave
women to machines of reproduction and slave men to social
irrelevancy.
This use of a commercial principle to vitiate a social relation-
ship led to a confusing legal situation. The courts responded
prodigiously to the many legal wrinkles produced without ever
really questioning the underlying premise or its social meaning.
Courts were, for example, perplexed by questions having to do
with the legal status of the children of an enslaved but soon to be
emancipated mother,122 and the fate of children born to a fugi-
tive123 or momentarily free124 mother.
in Early America: A Reappraisal, 1 Law & Hist. Rev. 129 (1983). For a discussion
of nineteenth century developments with respect to the legal status of wives and
children, see Grossberg, supra note 3, at 24-27.
120. One result of the rule was that it permitted the slave master to hold the
mulatto children whom he fathered by slave women as slave property, thus enlarg-
ing the slave population. Therefore, where the slave owner's extra-marital sex
might carry a social and financial penalty if the child he fathered were white, he
stood to gain in every way from the sexual abuse of slave women.
121. For a discussion of changes in popular views and in the legal construct of
marriage, lineage, and motherhood in one southern locale, see Susanne Lebsock,
The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern Town, 1784-1860,
at 15-53 (1984).
122. See, e.g., Caffey v. Davis, 54 N.C. (1 Jones Eq.) 1 (1853).
123. See, e.g., Fields v. Walker, 23 Ala. 155 (1853), in which the owner of a fugi-
tive slave sought to recover the slave's children, invoking the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793. The Alabama Supreme Court denied the claim, holding that the quality of
"fugitive" was not inheritable.
124. See, e.g., Bank v. Benham, 23 Ala. 143 (1853), where the child of an emanci-
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In addition to the question whether a slave's child was born
free or not, another highly litigated issue was who owned the
child. The courts debated whether in determining ownership dis-
putes, slave children could be treated like the offspring of farm an-
imals. At common law, animal offspring were "natural fruits"
which were deemed the property of the mother animal's owner.125
Yet, since the judges were dealing with the relationship between
mother and child, a relationship which the culture deemed sacred
and fundamental, the commercial analogy to farm animals was not
altogether satisfying. As one court put it, "the law . . . treats
[slaves], as human beings, deprived, doubtless for wise purposes, of
their freedom ... and in our opinion the rule which applies to [the
disposition of animals' issue] has no application to them."126
The legal controversy typically arose in the interpretation of
a slave owner's bequest of a slave mother to one legatee for life
with a remainder interest in another legatee. The question be-
came which legatee owned the children she bore during the life es-
tate. If, as was the case in Delaware127 and Maryland, 28 the
children born during the life estate became the property of the life
tenant, then, upon the death of the life tenant, the slave mother
would be, by operation of law, separated from her children, who
became part of the life tenant's estate.
One Tennessee case presents an especially chilling example
of how the slave mother and her children could get caught in the
vise of the potentially conflicting interests of the life tenant and
the remainderman. 129 The bequest was of the slave woman, Sally,
to the testator's widow for life with the remainder interest in Sally
to go to his children. The rule in Tennessee was that the offspring
of the slave born during the life tenancy went to the remainder-
men. The life tenant, the widow, petitioned the court to sell Sally
because of "her bad temper, violent passions, immoral habits, and
refusal to submit .... ,,130 But Sally, having given birth to several
pated bondwoman was deemed free, although the woman was re-enslaved to satisfy
the claims of antecedent creditors. The court held that, as there were no liens
against the slave when the child was born, the baby was born of a free woman.
125. E.g., Herndon v. Herndon's Adm'rs, 27 Mo. 421 (1858); Wilks's Adm'r v.
Greer, 14 Ala. 437 (1848); see also Patterson v. Bonner, 14 La. 214 (1839).
126. Greer, 14 Ala. at 445. See also Herndon v. Herndon's Adm'rs, where a Mis-
souri court said: "A difference [as to the disposition of the issue] has thus been
adopted between slaves and other property, founded upon motives of humanity and
having regard to the moral as well as legal relations between master and slave."
Herndon, 27 Mo. at 422.
127. E.g., Smith v. Milman, 2 Del (2 Harr.) 497 (1839).
128. E.g., Scott v. Dobson, 1 H. & McH. 160 (Md. 1749).
129. Arrington v. Grisson, 41 Tenn. (1 Cold.) 522 (1860).
130. Id. at 523.
1987]
Law and Inequality
children, had shown herself to be fecund, and it was therefore in
the interest of the remaindermen to hold on to her. The Tennes-
see court refused to sanction the sale, noting that the "sale of the
slave, so peculiarly valuable for her physical capacity of child-bear-
ing, so far from being for the benefit of the owners of the remain-
der-interest, was an enormous sacrifice, though it may have been
otherwise, as to the life-owner."131
Other questions as to the ownership of a slave mother's issue
were equally fraught with difficulty. Where there was a lawsuit
over ownership of a slave woman, there was a question as to who
owned the children she bore during the pendency of the suit.132
Another problem arose upon the master's divorce: were slave chil-
dren to be deemed community property, or were they the separate
property of the spouse who owned their mother at the commence-
ment of the marriage?133 The courts ended up on both sides of
these questions, without ever a query as to the role of the slave fa-
ther or the best interests of the slave child.
Indeed, just as the slave mother and father had no recognized
legal relations with the child, the slave child could claim nothing
from its parents. The lot of slave children was more damned and
unfortunate than that of illegitimate children, although slave chil-
dren were not strictly considered bastards.134 The slave child in-
herited its mother's status but was not assured of its parentage,
whereas the bastard was its mother's child in every sense.135 A
slave child could not claim membership in a household, or the
right to maintenance, nurturing, or custody from its birth
parents.136
131. Id. at 523-24.
132. One Mississippi court held that the winning party had the right to any issue
born during the pendency of the suit: "Having a right to recover the mother, the
plaintiff could recover that which the mother produced pending the suit .... " Jor-
dan v. Thomas, 31 Miss. 557, 563 (1856).
133. A Texas court held that "the increase" was the separate property of the
party bringing it into the marriage and "constitute[d] no part of the community of
gains .... Cartwright v. Cartwright, 18 Tex. 626, 644 (1857).
134. With respect to the rules governing bastardy, the-courts were unclear as to
the exact legal status of the slave child. Illegitimacy implied wrongdoing, and the
concept did not fit the slave family, which was denied the opportunity to be "legiti-
mate." Slaves were compelled to live outside the law, and yet they were not out-
laws. In attempting to describe a slave boy's status, one court termed the slave
child "not legitimate." Andrews v. Page, 3 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 653, 666 (1871).
135. In one case, the children of a free Black woman and a slave father were
held to be bastards, because, as a slave, the father could not legally marry. The
mother lost a habeas corpus action to release her children from apprenticeship.
The court reasoned that, as bastards, the children were public charges who could
properly be apprenticed against the mother's wishes. Brewer v. Harris, 5 Va. (1
Gratt.) 285, 303 (1848).
136. Id. at 305.
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One case illustrating the perversity of this situation involved
the claim of a Black, free father of a slave child to recover support
payments of his child.137 The father sued the estate of his son's
owner, arguing that his support of the boy when he was too young
to work inured to the benefit of the master, who by right should
have borne the cost. The reviewing court reversed a jury verdict
in the father's favor, holding that the father "had no just claim
whatever on the administrator for taking care of his own child."138
C. Family Law, Sexual Morality, and the Law/Morality
Dichotomy
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the courts took
varying avenues to resolve the vexatious law/morality split
presented by the contradiction between the legal constructs of the
family and slavery. Few of the judges had the perspicacity of
North Carolina's Chief Justice Ruffin, but all of them confronted
the dilemma which inhered in the very nature of the two institu-
tions. The dimensions of the problem were hardly unique to issues
of the family, but rather traversed the entire law of slavery.139
That slaves had to be, by virtue of their "nature," exempt
from laws embodying moral commands was the underlying princi-
ple in a Mississippi case which considered whether a slave could be
charged with intra-racial rape.140 The defendant was indicted
under a statute making it a crime to have sex with a child under
the age of ten. The victim, in this case, was also a slave. The re-
viewing court reversed the conviction and dismissed the indict-
ment for the reason that the statute did not explicitly include
slaves,141 and the common law did not cover slave crime. 142
137. Prince v. Cole, 28 Mo. 486 (1859).
138. Id. at 487.
139. See generally Higginbotham, supra note 1.
140. George v. State, 37 Miss. 316 (1859).
141. A year after George v. State was decided, the Mississippi legislature passed a
statute making it a crime punishable by death or whipping for a Black slave or
freeman to rape a Black female under 12 years old. Id. at 320 (citing 1859 Miss.
Laws 102).
142. Since slaves, who were at the same time chattel and human, had obscure
legal personalities, southern jurists repeatedly faced the problem of determining
under what legal rubric they could be criminally punished by the state. Slaves
were generally held not to be punishable under the state's criminal code or under
the common law. The common law was said to be inapplicable because, as the court
stated in George v. State, "slavery, as it exists in this country, was unknown to the
common law of England, and hence its provisions are inapplicable to injuries in-
flicted on the slave here." George, 37 Miss. at 320. The slave codes were enacted to
cover slave crime, but often they were not all-inclusive. The courts took different
approaches when called to pass upon a criminal offense charged against a slave for
which there was no specific slave statute.
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The slave, George, was not just a lucky defendant who fell
through a legal loophole. The lawyer for the accused argued that
Black rape was different from white rape:
The crime of rape does not exist in this State between African
slaves. Our laws recognize no marital rights as between slaves;
their sexual intercourse is left to be regulated by their owners.
The regulations of law, as to the white race, on the subject of
sexual intercourse, do not and cannot, for obvious reasons, ap-
ply to slaves; their intercourse is promiscuous, and the viola-
tion of a female slave by a male slave would be a mere assault
and battery.1 43
The court, noting that "[m]asters and slaves cannot be governed by
the same common system of laws: so different are their positions,
rights, and duties," 144 apparently concurred.
Indeed, because of the "difference" between Black and white
rape, a similar statutory lapse produced a wholly different result
in a case where the alleged rape victim was white. In the North
Carolina case of State v. Peter,145 the slave, Peter, appealed his
rape conviction, pointing out that the slave code only prohibited at-
tempted rape, and that since the code covering rape referred to
"persons" committing the crime, it did not cover the slave. The
court held, however, that the failure of the relevant rape statute to
explicitly bring slaves within its ambit was not cause to reverse the
conviction. It found a presumption that slaves were meant to be
covered by the statute "unless from the nature of the subject mat-
ter and the punishment imposed, it appears not to have been the
intention to embrace slaves."146
The existence of the loophole through which the defendant
in State v. Peter sought to escape was unusual, for in contrast to
the plight of the Black woman, who was much more likely to be
victimized by rape, the rape of a white woman by a slave (or a
Black freeman) was a capital offense in virtually every jurisdic-
tion. One Georgia court reflected the pervasive hysteria about this
most unspeakable offense: "The crime, from the very nature of it,
is calculated to excite indignation in every heart; and when perpe-
trated on a free white female of immature mind and body, that in-
dignation becomes greater, and is more difficult to repress."47
143. Id. at 317.
144. Id. at 320.
145. 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 19 (1860).
146. Id. at 24.
147. Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225, 230 (1852). The Stephen court's opinion con-
tains acknowledgement of what is now part of American history-that the criminal
process, no matter what its features, was utterly perverted by the Black man/white
woman rape charge:
I would, were I in the Jury-Box, seize upon the slightest proof of
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Moreover, even though a Mississippi court held, in George v.
State, that a Black girl under ten could not be legally raped, in the
slave rape case of State v. Sam, 148 a North Carolina court queried
whether perhaps the common law age of incapacity ought to be re-
duced from fourteen so as to allow the prosecution of Black boys
charged with rape:
A large portion of our population is of races from more South-
ern latitudes than that from which our common law comes.
We have indeed an element of great importance from the tor-
rid zone of Africa. It is unquestionable that climate, food,
clothing and the like, have a great influence in hastening phys-
ical development. Whether it may not be advisable to move
down to an earlier age than 14, the period of puberty, for a
portion, if not for all the elements in our population, may be a
proper inquiry for the statesman. 149
Since, in theory, the "nature" of the Black man was not af-
fected by the race of his victim, taken together, George v. State and
State v. Sam stand for the proposition that, while it was in the
Black man's "nature" to rape, it was not within the Black woman's
"nature" to be raped.
Indeed, for some time, the law did not recognize the rape of
the Black woman by any man, either Black or white. In question-
ing the wisdom of this legal void, the Georgia legal scholar,
Thomas Cobb, first inquired "whether the offence of rape, commit-
ted upon a female slave, should not be indictable; and whether,
when committed by the master, there should not be superadded
the sale of the slave to some other master." 150 He went on, how-
ever, to note that a change in the law would be only for the sake of
appearance, for "[t]he occurrence of such an offence is almost un-
heard of; and the known lasciviousness of the negro, renders the
possibility of its occurrence very remote."151
The "lasciviousness" of which he spoke was laid at the feet of
Black women. For, to the nineteenth century mind, sexual moral-
ity properly resided in the souls of women; men could not, by na-
ture, be expected to keep its commands. Thus, while the Black
race as a whole was bereft of moral values, it was Black women
resistance-notwithstanding she may have been enticed to give her
consent, in the first instance-even the usual struggles of a modest
maiden, young and inexperienced in such mysteries, to find . . . that
the act was against her will, and that the presumption of law was so
strong, as to amount to proof of force.
Id. at 239.
148. 60 N.C. (1 Win.) 293 (1864).
149. Id. at 296.




who bore the brunt of the accusation of lasciviousness.152
Thus, the courts reasoned that, by nature, Black men and wo-
men were incapable of adhering to a code of sexual morality, and
that they were therefore exempt from the natural moral strictures
of marriage and family. But this double standard worked both for
the system of slavery and against it. For while the system wished
to exclude slaves from marriage laws, including adultery and big-
amy, it also wanted to impose harsher penalties for Black man/
white woman sex crimes than for all-white sex crimes.
The argument that race created different "natural" propensi-
ties which the law should account for was problematic, for in some
instances, it was crucial to recognize the common humanity of all
to whom the law spoke, slave and non-slave alike. In exempting
slaves from certain moral edicts, these commands lost their
universality. This challenged the idea that the laws were divinely
derived, diminishing their binding force for whites.
These conflicting goals made it impossible for the courts to
achieve doctrinal consistency. The core of the problem here, as in
all of slave law, was the slave's dual status as person and chat-
tel.153 Moreover, southern jurists were operating within a legal
framework whose moorings were embedded in bourgeois ideology.
Slave law and bourgeois law were at odds-one idealized personal
will; the other denied its relevance to the law. To define slavery
itself was to define the legal contradiction: the master owned the
slave, and yet could not own the person of the slave.
The courts traveled many avenues in search of a rational so-
lution to this contradiction. In some respects, the courts sought to
limit their own purview to the regulation of matters pertaining to
the slave's commercial character, leaving to the slaveholder the
regulation of his bondman's social character.15 4 The jurists sought
to circumvent their dilemma by taking slave law out of the reach
of the common law, intervening only upon explicit statutory au-
152. This image of the Black woman as naturally licentious and as the seed of
sexual evil justified and excused the exploitation of her reproductive function in
the slave economy. See generally discussion in Jacobs, supra note 50.
153. Chief Justice Taney described the slave as "a person and also property. As
property, the rights of the owner are entitled to the protection of the law. As a
person, he is bound to obey the law, and may, like any other person, be punished if
he offends against it .... U.S. v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859)(No.
14,445).
154. Mark Tushnet makes the persuasive argument that what he terms the law/
sentiment dichotomy within slave law was related to the market relations/slave re-
lations dichotomy within the developing law of the bourgeois state. "Slave law rec-
ognized regulation by law rather than by sentiment more readily the closer the




thority, or where the analogy with areas of tort or contract law
was clear, and keeping strictly within the bounds of precedent.
It was impossible, however, to keep this line between the so-
cial and commercial sides of the system sharp, because---as with
the case of Black man/white woman rape-the slave's social inter-
actions often fell outside plantation justice and brought the law
"on the books" into play. Therefore, in order to maintain white
supremacy, the courts were compelled to regulate relations be-
tween whites and Blacks. In order to hold slaves answerable for
crimes they committed, they had to be recognized in law as mor-
ally and socially responsible persons. The reverse was also true,
for, as exemplified by the rule, partus sequitur ventrem, commer-
cial rules inevitably invaded the slave's social existence. Thus, the
slave was, from a legal perspective, at once a person and a thing.155
The implications of the slave's dual status for the law of the
family were difficult to untangle, for there was an analogous dual-
ity in family law itself. Marriage, for example, legally changed
both social and property relations. Parenting created new social
and property relations. The law favored and protected family rela-
tionships and sought to regulate these social relations using,
among other legal tools, criminal sanctions. Therefore, if the crimi-
nal law was properly an instrument of social control for both slave
and non-slave alike, how could its inapplicability to slave sexual
morality be explained?
The hybrid nature of family relationships such as marriage
was the source of the problem. As the slave was a moral and social
being, the strictures of legal marriage logically should have been
applied to him or her. But the slave was a chattel, and, therefore,
as legal marriage altered property relations for the new husband
and wife, the law of marriage had no meaning for the slave.
Similarly, parenting should have brought for the slave
mother and father mutual social ties and financial responsibilities.
155. As one scholar of slavery summarized it:
[T]here was a deep-seated ambivalence between the conception of the
slave as property, and as a person. The law seemed to give him recog-
nition as a person with one hand, and take it away with the other. The
slave could be guilty of a crime as a person, but if executed his master
might be paid for the loss of his property. An assault upon a slave by
an unauthorized person was judged to be a criminal offense, but this
was in the interest of keeping the peace, and the master could main-
tain a suit for damage to his property. The crime of murder could be
committed against a slave, but ordinarily not by his master, since the
latter would scarcely plan to destroy his own property. The chief
value of the slave as property lay in his being a person, but his chief
value as a person lay in his being held as property.
Moore, supra note 117, at 201.
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As the slave mother was merely an instrumentality of reproduc-
tion, however, the laws of bastardy, custody and the like-which
served to legally define the parent-child relation-were dysfunc-
tional as applied to her. As the slave father could not be paid for
his labor, he also could assume no legal responsibility for his
children.
IV. Conclusion
As Harriet Beecher Stowe set the scene at the beginning of
Uncle Tom's Cabin,'56 she described the handsome and talented
young slave, George, relating a tale of woe to his beautiful wife,
Eliza. Eliza, who is owned by the Shelbys, and George live on
neighboring plantations and George, who has recently been tor-
mented to the breaking point by a mean and jealous master, is vis-
iting to deliver to his wife the news that their marriage might be
short-lived. This is their conversation:
George: I wish I could be good; but my heart burns, and
can't be reconciled, anyhow. You couldn't in my place-you
can't now, if I tell you all I've got to say. You don't know the
whole yet.
Eliza: What can be coming now?
George: Well, lately Mas'r has been saying that he was a
fool to let me marry off the place; that he hates Mr. Shelby
and all his tribe... and he says he won't let me come here any
more, and that I shall take a wife and settle down on his place.
At first he only scolded and grumbled these things; but yester-
day he told me that I should take Mina for a wife; and settle
down in a cabin with her, or he would sell me down river.
Eliza: Why-but you were married to me, by the minis-
ter, as much as if you'd been a white man!
George: Don't you know a slave can't be married? There
is no law in this country for that; I can't hold you for my wife,
if he chooses to part us. 157
George spoke the bitter truth. The law had a lot to say about
marriage, but for him and Eliza it boiled down to this: a slave
could not be married if his or her master opposed.
This article has attempted to demonstrate how slave law per-
verted George and Eliza's marriage vow and how it tortuously
twisted relations between slave parents and their children at a his-
torical moment when marriage was a moral imperative and the
family a divine institution. At a time when the church, the law,
popular culture-indeed, all voices-placed the traditional family
156. I Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852).
157. Id. at 35-36.
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on a pedestal, where it was sacred and revered, the slave could
only experience a cruelly mediated and debased version.
The needs of slavery have corroded both our legal legacy and
our collective family experience. A careful analysis of the contri-
bution of the slave experience to the current vicissitudes of the
Afro-American family must take account of the failure of the
courts to exercise moral and legal authority and the consequent
quasi-law making role of the slave-master.
After emancipation, as Afro-Americans removed their chains
to take a new place on the social and political landscape, the theme
of Black immorality that had served the antebellum judges so well
persisted. With the end of slavery, its functional place in the law
was transformed. The idea that Blacks were immoral by nature
became a foundational stone, not for slave property, but for social
segregation and Jim Crow. The story of this link between racial
ideology and sexual morality in our antebellum legal inheritance is
one of tremendous contemporary significance, for it can provide
the historical antecedents and assist in decoding the hidden
messages in much of family and sexual law today.
1987]

